The act of persuasion, a key component in rhetoric argumentation, may be viewed as a dynamics modifier. Such modifiers are wellknown in other research fields: recall dynamic epistemic logic where operators modify possible world accessibilities, or recall side effects and concurrency in programming languages. We consider persuasion in abstract argumentation as undertaking a similar role. We extend Dung's frameworks with acts of persuasion among agents into Abstract Persuasion Argumentation (APA), and set forth properties related to arguments' admissibilities. We show a way of enriching our basic notion of admissibility through CTL (computation tree logic) encoding, which also permits importation of the theoretical results known to the logic into our argumentation frameworks.
INTRODUCTION
An interesting component of rhetoric argumentation is persuasion. We may code an act of it into A:a 1 B:a 2 a 1 B:a 3 with the following intended meaning: some agent A's argument a 1 persuades an agent B into holding a 3 ; B, being persuaded, drops a 2 . There can be various reasons for the persuasive act. It may be that A is a great teacher wanting to correct some inadvisable norm of B's, or perhaps A is a manipulator who benefits if a 2 is not present. Persuasion is popularly observed in social forums including YouTube and Twitter, and methods to represent it will help understand users' views on topics accurately. Another less pervasive form of persuasion is possible: A:a 1 a 1 B:a 3 in which A persuades B with a 1 into expressing a 3 but without conversion. Like this manner, persuasion acts as a dynamics modifier in rhetoric argumentation, allowing some argument to appear and disappear. Of course, these acts will not be successful if a 1 is found to be not an acceptable argument: we may have C:a 3 → A:a 1 a 1 B:a 2
where a 3 attacks a 1 , in which case B is not persuaded into holding a 2 . For judging the success of a persuasion act based on other arguments, the theoretical framework of abstract argumentation by Dung [17] is viable, as it facilitates acceptability of a set of arguments when attacks among them are given. We incorporate the persuasion acts into argumentation frameworks, and study how they influence abstract argumentation frameworks. Overall, our frameworks are to Dung's frameworks broadly what dynamic epistemic logic is to epistemic logic, in the very sense that dynamic operators are embedded in a language (framework). While AGM-like argumentation framework revisions defining a class of resulting argumentation frameworks from an initially given argumentation framework and an Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). © 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). .
input (which could be argument(s), attack(s) or both) are being studied, there are very few studies of a similar dynamism in the literature, and none in the context of argumentation with persuasion as far as our awareness goes. Bridging dynamics and statics is important for detailed and more precise analysis of rhetoric argumentation. We formulate the notion of admissibility in our frameworks, and then show a way of enriching it into other types of admissibilities through CTL (computation tree logic) embedding.
Example situations
Animal Farm (George Orwell, 1945), a satirical novella, illustrates how easy it is for a power to control social norms. Though written to general audience, it features many critical components of rhetoric argumentation such as the use of pseudo-logic, scapegoating, and half-truths [13] , to persuade other agents. In the story, farm animals chase away their farm owner Jones to govern the farm themselves free of human tyranny. They institute norms, among which is All animals are equal, to be followed by all animals. Pigs take on a leading role of indoctrinating other animals and of running the farm, gradually gaining a dominant influence over other animals, however. Ultimately they rectify the above-stated norm into All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others, reinstating the tyranny against which the farm animals once united. We extract some arguments from the novella. The above figure represents these arguments. Now, what we have is a potentially irreversible branching. If a 2 persuades a 1 into a 4 , it is no longer possible for a 3 to persuade a 1 , as a 1 will not be available for persuasion. If a 3 persuades a 1 into a 5 , on the other hand, it is no longer possible that a 2 persuades a 1 . A certain partial order may be defined among persuasion (like in preference-based argumentation), but the non-deterministic consideration leads to a more general theory (like in probabilistic argumentation) in which the actual behaviour of a system is dependent on run-time executions. Just as in program analysis, however, it may be still possible to identify certain properties, whichever an actual path may be. In this particular example, (Alice holding) a 1 may be persuaded into holding a 4 or else a 5 , and we cannot tell which with certainty. However, we can certainly predict a 6 's emergence. Our interests are in obtaining varieties in arguments admissibility so that such a query as 'Is a 6 going to be an admissible argument in whatever order persuasive acts may take place?' is possible.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUNDS
In Dung's abstract argumentation [17] , an argumentation framework is a tuple (A, R) where A is (usually) a finite set of arguments (and in the rest any A with or without a subscript is assumed to be a set of arguments) while R is a binary relation over A, the class of all arguments. An argument a 1 (∈ A) is said to attack another argument a 2 (∈ A) if and only if, or iff, (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ R. A subset A 1 of A is said to accept, synonymously to defend, a x ∈ A iff it is possible to find some a z ∈ A 1 for each a ∈ A attacking a x such that a z attacks a x . A subset A 1 of A is said to be: conflict-free iff no element of A 1 attacks an element of A 1 ; admissible iff it is conflict-free and it accepts all the elements of A 1 ; complete iff it is admissible and includes any argument it defends; preferred iff it is a set-theoretically maximal admissible set; stable iff it is preferred and attacks every argument in A\A 1 ; and grounded iff it is the set intersection of all complete sets of A.
ABSTRACT ARGUMENTATION WITH PERSUASION
Instead of the Dung binary relation, we use a ternary relation:
resents a 1 a 2 a 1 a 3 (active persuasion or to convert), and (a 1 , a 2 , ϵ) ∈ R represents a 1 → a 2 (attack). Let us term this abstract argumentation with persuasion as APA (Abstract Persuasion Argumentation). An APA framework is a (A I , A, R, →) for A I ⊆ A and →⊆ 2 A × (2 A × 2 A ). A I is the set of all initially visible arguments. It corresponds to the set of initial states in a state transition system. As in a transition system, a transition occurs in APA framework, too, modifying one set of all visible arguments to 'a' next set of all visible arguments. → is the transition relation. The first component of the Cartesian product is for relativising the transition judgement to a reference arguments set, in particular, to visible arguments of the reference set. There is nothing new in the relativisation: we saw in Section 2 that judgement of acceptance of an argument a x was relative to some set of arguments A 1 . Elements of → are derived constructively from A I for each reference arguments set, and to determine them, we only need to calculate all the next sets of visible arguments from a given set of all visible arguments. Therefore, at present, let us just assume Vis A to be the set of all 'currently' visible arguments, which equates to A I initially. If A 1 → A x A (which is another way of stating (A x , (A 1 , A )) ∈ → in this paper), A becomes Vis A after the transition.
To define the function that does the one-step calculation, we first of all obtain all possible persuasion acts for each reference arguments set A 1 . We say that a persuasion act (a 1 , α, a 2 ) ∈ R for α ∈ {ϵ } ∪ A is possible at Vis A ('at Vis A ' means when the set of all visible arguments is currently Vis A ) for A 1 just when (1) a 1 ∈ Vis A and (2) no a ∈ A 1 ∩ Vis A attacks a 1 . We assume some function NextRRelTo Vis A : 2 A → 2 R such that NextRRelTo Vis A (A 1 ) is the set of all persuasion acts possible for A 1 at Vis A . Meanwhile, we let exec Vis A : 2 R → 2 A be the function that does the one-step calculation with exec Vis A (B) = (Vis A \{a ∈ Vis A | (a x , a, a ) ∈ B}) ∪ {a ∈ A\Vis A | (a x , ϵ, a) ∈ B or (a x , a , a) ∈ B} which updates Vis A by adding all arguments that are made visible by any persuasive act in B, and by subtracting all arguments that are made invisible by conversion in B unless they are made visible by other persuasive acts in B (i.e. unless cancellation of the effect occurs). With this, we define that (A 1 , (Vis A , exec Vis A (R))) ∈ → for all A 1 ⊆ A, R ⊆ NextRRelTo Vis A (A 1 ) and Vis A , and we define also that → does not include any other elements. Clearly this definition is inductive from A I .
To explain the motivation for the 'exec Vis A (R) for all R ⊆ NextRRelTo Vis A (A 1 Assume that a square argument is initially visible, so that we have A I = {a 1 , a 2 , a 4 } in the top-left figure, A I = {a 1 , a 2 } in the topright figure, and A I = {a 1 , a 3 , a 4 } in the bottom figure. In case we have more than one persuasion, a change to be incurred to Vis A may be synchronous or asynchronous. In the former, all persuasive acts that are currently possible are checked before any changes are effected, and all the changes occur simultaneously. If persuasion is synchronous in the top-left figure, we obtain both a 5 as incurred by a 4 and a 3 as incurred by a 1 . In asynchronous active persuasion (as we saw earlier in the Alice example), not all possible persuasive acts may be simultaneously executed, although that is one possibility. 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) takes place but not (a 4 , ϵ, a 2 )). And these are all the possible transitions in the top-right figure.
The bottom figure contains persuasive acts and, unlike in the two previous figures, also an attack. For any A 1 such that a 2 A 1 , we have {a 1 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 3 , a 5 } (if conversion takes place before inducement) or {a 1 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } (if inducement takes place before conversion) or {a 1 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 5 } (if both persuasion acts take place at the same time). From {a 1 , a 3 a 5 }, we have {a 1 , a 3 , a 5 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 5 }. From {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 }, we have {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } (if conversion does not take place) or {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 1 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 5 }. However, for any A 2 such that a 2 ∈ A 2 , the conversion will not take place when a 2 ∈ Vis A . While, if Vis A does not contain a 2 , the transitions from Vis A are the same as before, from {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 }, we do not have {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } → A 2 {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 5 }.
Admissibilities
Now, what distinct properties are there for an admissible arguments set in APA frameworks? Just as conflict-freeness and defendedness in Dung's frameworks, reasonable criteria may be set forth. Conflict-freeness We say that A 1 ⊆ A is currently conflict-free iff no visible element of A 1 attacks a visible element of A 1 at Vis A . Mutation-freeness We say that A 1 ⊆ A is currently mutation-free iff no visible element of A 1 converts a visible element of A 1 at Vis A . Defendedness We say that A 1 ⊆ A is currently defended iff for each (a 2 , a 1 , α) ∈ R for a 2 ∈ Vis A \A 1 , a 1 ∈ Vis A ∩ A 1 and α ∈ {ϵ } ∪ A, there exists some a x ∈ Vis A ∩ A 1 such that (a x , a 2 , ϵ) ∈ R. Properness We say that A 1 ⊆ A is currently proper iff A 1 ⊆ Vis A .
Mutation-freeness is a natural variation of conflict-freeness for internal conversions, and defendedness is a natural extension of Dung's defendedness with conversions. Properness ensures that we will not be talking of invisible arguments. The major difference from Dung's properties is that, because of transitions of currently visible arguments, all these properties are dependent on Vis A . We naturally find characterisation of 'current' admissibility with these notions: A 1 ⊆ A is currently admissible iff A 1 is currently conflict-free, mutation-free, defended and proper.
For general admissibilities, one way of describing more varieties is to embed this admissibility and transitions into computation tree logic (CTL) or other branching-time logic, by which model-theoretical results known to the logic become available to APA frameworks, too. Let the grammar of ϕ be:
is the atomic expression that some set of arguments A x is currently admissible in an argumentation framework δ := (A I , A, R, →). We did not include Until operators for certain semantic awkwardness, as to be mentioned later. We denote the class of all atomic predicates for δ by P δ . For semantics, let S be the class of all sequences of the elements of X:
We refer to an element of S by Γ. Γ may be empty. Let L : 2 A → 2 P δ be a labelling function such that L(A x ) = {P δ (A ) ∈ P δ | A is currently admissible when Vis A is A x }. We define a head and a tail operator h : S → X, t : S → S, such that for any non-empty Γ, we have h(Γ).t(Γ) = Γ. Here '.' is a sequence concatenator. We define M := (S, δ, L) to be a transition system with the following forcing relations. 1
1 The liberty of allowing arguments into M causes no confusion, much less issues. If one is so inclined, he/she may choose to consider that components of δ that appear in M are semantic counterparts of those that appear in the syntax of CTL with one-to-one correspondence between them.
• M,
We say that ϕ is true in δ iff M, A I , (empty) |= ϕ. It is straightforward to see the following well-known equivalences of CTL in our semantics. ¬AFϕ ≡ EG¬ϕ, ¬EFϕ ≡ AG¬ϕ, ¬AXϕ ≡ EG¬ϕ (De Morgan's Laws), AGϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ AXAGϕ, EGϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ EXEGϕ, AFϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ AXAFϕ, EFϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ EXEFϕ (Expansion Laws) by induction on the size (the number of symbols) of ϕ.
As readers notice, we are dealing with all state transitions only at entailments of an atomic expression. This is because semantic interpretation of an expression of the kind EX(P δ (A 1 ) ∧ P δ (A 2 )) with a temporal operator over more than two atomic predicates are possibly taking a distinct arguments set. In words, this expression says: there exists a transition such that after the transition, P δ (A 1 ) and P δ (A 2 ) are both true in the next state. However, the meaning of the 'next state' actually depends on the parameter to P δ , as a transition by a persuasive act is relativised to a reference arguments set. As such, until the recursive entailment reaches an atomic expression, we cannot really pinpoint which states the next states are. The consequence is that EX, EF, EG distribute over inner expressions, e.g. EX(ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) and EXϕ 1 ∧ EXϕ 2 have the same semantic meaning. The reason we dropped Until operators is due to this semantic interpretation that it does not reflect an ordinary expectation out of the operations. Of course, when it is known that all atomic predicates accept the same arguments set, a more standard interpretation may be given, and the Until operators will behave as anticipated. We shall discuss these semantic interpretations in a greater detail in a future work.
There are some notable admissibility types we can take out of the CTL sub-logic.
(1) EXP δ (A x ) and EFP δ (A x ). An example situation where these properties are useful: a sales person X can attempt persuasion of his/her unwilling customer A just once (EXP δ (A x )) or as many as he/she likes (EFP δ (A x )) before A delivers a final decision. Is it possible to influence A's decision to include A x , favourable decisions to X? The duals of these expressions deal with negative statements. Enforcement [9] is somehow related to a particular instance of these kinds of queries. (2) AGP δ (A x ): An example: a patient is under treatment for one morbidity based on a clinical guideline. His/her clinician sees a need of prescribing more actions to him/her for another morbidity he/she sustains. Is it possible that those actions (described with the persuasion operators) will keep the currently attained desirable effects of the treatment (A x ) intact? The dual of this expression deals with negative statements.
Adaptation of Dung's complete, preferred, stable and grounded semantics should also diversify our admissibilities. It must be noted, however, that the presence of our relativised dynamic transitions do not permit step-wise construction of a preferred set from the grounded set as meaningfully as in Dung's.
Conclusion with related work
We have shown a new research direction for abstract argumentation with dynamic operators of persuasive acts on Dung's frameworks.
We set forth important properties and notions, and showed embedding of 'current admissibility' into CTL for various admissibilities. Many technical developments are expected to follow. Our contribution is promising for bringing together knowledge of abstract argumentation in AI and techniques and issues of concurrency in program analysis in a very near future. Cross-studies in the two domains is highly expected. Studying concurrent aspects of argumentation are in fact important for evaluation of opinion transitions, which influences development of more effective sales approaches and better marketing in business, and consensus control tactics in politics. Harnessing our study with probabilistic methods are likely to form exciting research. Our present plan is to take into account nuances of persuasive acts like pseudo-logic, scapegoating, threat, and half-truths in addition to the future work we mentioned earlier.
For dynamic aspects, [6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 26] calculate a modified argumentation framework (post-state) from an original argumentation framework (pre-state) given some input. In spirit, they are similar to the AGM belief revision [1] . Coordination of dynamics and statics, on the other hand, is still under-investigated. A kind was studied in [3] for coalition profitability and formability semantics. More closely, propositional dynamic logic [16] was used to represent abstract argumentation so that in the language addition and removal of arguments and attacks may be expressed. In an extended work, we will detail comparisons with their work.
Argumentation theories that accommodate aspects of persuasion have been noted across several papers. In [7] , argumentation frameworks were augmented with values that controlled defeat judgement. Unlike their work, our persuasion acts are stand-alone relations which may be 'executed' non-deterministically and concurrently, may irreversibly modify visible arguments, and may produce loops. In most of argumentation papers on this topic, persuasion or negotiation is treated in a dialogue game [2, 8, 10, [18] [19] [20] [22] [23] [24] [25] . While we do not assume any dialogue here, our admissibilities should provide means of describing many types of argumentation queries. Studies on temporal arguments include [4, 5, 21] . These actually consider arguments that may be time-dependent. APA frameworks keep arguments abstract, but observe temporal progress through actual execution of persuasive acts. Our use of temporal logic is for describing admissibilities rather than arguments (recall that P δ (A x ) is a formula on admissibility and not an argument). The idea of visible and invisible arguments is similar to usable and unusable arguments in [5] . However, while their usable/unusable judgement is coupled directly with defendedness of arguments, our visibility changes are in accordance to executions of persuasive acts.
